There are two main weaknesses that scoundrel Tannin's two-faced defence of the American murderers. One is obvious, the other more subtle. First the obvious one.
The Allies repeatedly made peace overtures towards Japan, but in terms which, realistically, the Japanese government was never going to accept.
The best-known version of the Allied position is the Potsdam Declaration of early July 1945. This was very late in the day - only a few weeks before Hiroshima - but it was essentially a rehash of previous declarations with little by way of major change. It's worth quoting an abridged version of the Wikipedia summary:
On July 26, the United States, Britain and China released the Potsdam Declaration announcing the terms for Japan's surrender, with the warning, "We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay." For Japan, the terms of the declaration specified:
- the elimination "for all time of the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest"
- the occupation of "points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies"
- that the "Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." Japan was to be reduced to her pre-1894 territory and stripped of her pre-war empire including Korea and Taiwan, as well as all her recent conquests.
- Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.
- "we do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners."
- "The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established."
- "Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted."
- "The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government."
The only use of the term "unconditional surrender" came at the end of the declaration: "We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."
The Declaration made no mention of the Emperor at all. Allied intentions on issues of utmost importance to the Japanese, including whether Hirohito was to be regarded as one of those who had "misled the people of Japan" or even a war criminal, or alternatively, whether the Emperor might become part of a "peacefully inclined and responsible government" were thus left unstated.
On face value, this all seems very measured and reasonable. But it was always going to be very, very hard for the Japanese to swallow the entire loss of their empire. Japan had fought hard and with utter ruthlessness to conquer an empire between about 1890 and 1941, in particular Japan had fought very nasty wars with much bigger, albeit shambolic and incompetent, nations in China and then Russia. Japan then invaded Korea and, step by step, swallowed up vast areas of China. Japan's self image, its pride - and the Japanese are huge on pride, then as now - its standing as a grown-up nation fit to stand alongside the great colonial powers depended on its conquered empire.
Second, the elimination "for all time of the authority and influence of those" who had started the war - i.e., the military junta ruling Japan - mean that the very people supposedly offering to surrender the nation would be themselves immediately thrown out of power. Worse, there was the threat that "stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals". This seemed to mean that most of the cabinet would be facing a firing squad.
(As indeed they should have done. In fact, although Tojo and Hirota were hanged, and Koiso, Kido, and Araki were given life terms, many other senior government (i.e., military) officials got off far too lightly, as did the Emperor himself. Rightly or wrongly, the Allies (well, the Americans, no-one else got much say) decided that it would be expedient to pretend the Emperor was an innocent dupe of the military, which wasn't altogether true. In particular, the Americans made a last minute concession allowing the Imperial family to remain in power as they (correctly) judged that to insist on complete surrender would only prolong the war as most Japanese were utterly loyal to the Emperor.)
Finally, the Allies insisted that the war crimes trials would be before international courts. The Japanese were completely unwilling to agree to this.
Overall, there was a failure of understanding and a failure of communication between Japan and the Allies. Japan might well have surrendered earlier if the Allies had explicitly promised to the retain the rule of the Imperial Family. Possibly - just
possibly mark you - the military junta might have, in that peculiar all or nothing Japanese way, have found a way to accept that, to "take one for the team", if you like. But probably not. And in any case, it was very, very difficult for the Allies to swallow the notion of allowing the leader who had overseen such a horrible war of brutal aggression to remain in power. It would have been like Germany surrendering provided that Hitler could stay in charge. The wonder is that they (the Allies) eventually
did swallow that pill - albeit sugar-coating it in a vast amount of post-hoc propaganda about him being a mere tool in the hands of the military nuts, which was only half true.
And on the Japanese side of things, there was a near total failure to communicate the real sticking points to the Allies. Perhaps if they had managed to let the Allies know that many of their demands were, although unwelcome, at least acceptable, then there might have been more room to move on the two or three things the Japanese found hardest to swallow.
Japan was negotiating via the Soviet Union for most of this time. These negotiations went nowhere at all. This was because they weren't really negotiations. The Japanese didn't seem to take them seriously - honest, humble negotiation isn't usually something a power-mad military junta is very good at - and yet at the same time seemed to have some child-like faith that something would suddenly emerge from the peace talks if they could only hang on for long enough, shedding oceans of blood with every passing hour while they waited for the miracle. One gets the sense that peace negotiations were not a fit task for grown men, they were more like women's work: not honourable or heroic, just something that some other person did and suddenly your room was clean and a tasty meal arrived.
On the Soviet side, there seems to have been no real effort either. I don't recall seeing any evidence of this, but the obvious conclusion is probably correct: Stalin had not the slightest interest in ending the war early. He just wanted to keep them talking for as long as it took to ship the Red Army from Berlin to Manchuria and then start grabbing territory. If they had surrendered to the Americans in, say, May 1945 Stalin would not have been best pleased.
One last point should be mentioned before we leave the peace talks theme. It is
trust. By their manner of waging war - undeclared sneak attacks, torture of prisoners, no respect for life, or indeed for
any of the normal civilised behaviours such as staying surrendered once surrendered and not surrendering only as a ruse to let you kill another dozen enemy by shooting them in the back - by all these things, the Japanese Army (which controlled the government and indeed
was the government to all intents) had made it almost impossible for an opponent to trust them. How could anyone take a surrender from these people who routinely violated the normal rules of war? how could you trust them not to simply wait for an opportune moment and then start fighting again? In the end, the Allies did, and the Japanese
did stop fighting,
did stop the suicide attacks ... but what would have happened if the Yanks had insisted on locking up the Emperor?